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P IO T R  SZUKALSKI
Ethnic and religious changes in Western Europe 
in the first decades of the 21st century
1. Introduction
Demographic outlooks on W estern Europe that have been constructed in the recent 
years indicate that in the long term  its population w ill reproduce at a level below  
replacement. Consequently, the population w ill decrease and the share o f seniors will 
grow larger. The advancing aging o f the population linked w ith demographic implosion 
will entail mass immigration, an influx o f young people capable o f strengthening the 
continent’s econom y that w ill have to cope w ith a shortage o f workers in the future 
- particularly workers ready to take the low-skilled and low-paid jobs. Given the 
limited potential resource o f immigrants in other European countries and in overseas 
countries mainly populated by people o f European descent, most immigrants are likely 
to come from other regions o f the world.
This mechanism arises from the logic o f the long-term demographic changes 
that can be compared to the so-called transition o f spatial mobility associated with 
the demographic transition. The model assumes that in periods o f fast expanding 
populations international migration becomes one o f the effective solutions to the 
problem o f overpopulation -  moreover, at some stage it is obviously the major solution. 
At present, high dynamics o f population growth can be found in the South American, 
Asian and, above all, African countries, where demographic transition is still going 
on. These regions o f the w orld  have a „surplus” o f people and so they try to "export" 
at least some o f them, one o f the destinations being the continent o f Europe. In the 
coming decades, this tendency w ill have a huge effect o f unimaginable consequences 
on Europe’s ethnic composition.
This article aims to present the magnitude o f the changes that w ill affect the ethnic 
and religious composition o f the W estern European society in the coming decades, as 
well as the probable social consequences o f the changes. A direct intellectual impulse 
that led to the preparation o f this article was produced by the expert report „The 
demographic vision o f Europe in 2050 [W izja  demograficzna Europy 2050 roku ) which 
was compiled for the Forecast Committee, Polish Academy o f Sciences [Szukalski, 
2007]. Some aspects discussed in the report’s final version induced more reflections, 
thus provid ing a starting point for this article.
2. Changing ethnic structure o f Western Europe in the coming decades
The section below  presents several variant outlooks on the ethnic composition o f 
the European population to the year 2050 that w ere prepared by the UN forecasters 
[UN, 2001] and several European states [Coleman, 2006]. A  more detailed discussion 
o f the outlooks has to be preceded, though, by several comments on the methodologies 
underlying the estimations.
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Firstly, the term  „population o f foreign origin” as used in the outlooks refers to 
the immigrant population that is ethnically different from that living in the given area 
and to the immigrants’ children. Accordingly their grandchildren are considered to be 
the native population, regardless o f how  strongly they identify themselves w ith their 
country o f residence. Because o f that, the estimations undervalue the degree to which 
immigration shapes the ethnic picture o f our continent. The relevant question concerns 
integration (o r simply assim ilation) between the immigrant and native populations.
Secondly, the sizes o f ethnic minorities in particular W estern European countries 
are considerably at variance, likew ise the countries' shares and structures o f the 
immigrant populations. Because o f the different starting points the countries have, 
forecasts produce dissimilar results even if m igration balances are relatively the 
same.
Thirdly, immigrants are usually characterised by higher fertility rates than 
populations119 living in the receiving countries. Owing to the factor and the much 
younger age profile o f the immigrant populations, natural increase becomes another 
engine driving their growth.
With the above comments in mind, let us examine several independently compiled 
reports.
The computations that the UN forecasters made several years ago [UN, 2001] were 
intended to determ ine the magnitude o f migration that was necessary to provide 
European countries w ith demographic stability120.1 wish to underline that the results 
o f outlooks built upon particular objectives/desiderata are shocking and scary, using 
the terms that have become so popular among the Polish politicians. This opinion 
especially applies to two objectives concerning the values o f the potential support ratio, 
whose fulfilment in the first half o f the 21st c. would require, if one w ished to maintain 
the ratio’s maximal values for Europe and EU-15, 1,386 million and 701 million 
immigrants, respectively (its not a mistake, in the first case the order o f magnitude is 
109). A  cursory look at the above values is enough to understand that the scenario is not 
feasible. However, even a more „realistic” variant (requiring low er in flow s) estimating 
the potential support ratio at 3.0 in 2050 indicates that Europe would need 235 million 
immigrants and the EU 154 millions; for some European countries the numbers would 
be 35 millions (Ita ly ) and 40 millions (Germ any)121. Let us note that the numbers o f
119. For instance, around the year 2000 the non-European immigrants accounted for 66% in the UK, in the Nether­
lands it was 62% and in France 59%; in Belgium and Sweden these immigrants represented „only” 40% o f the immi­
grant population [Coleman, 2006: 405].
120. The publication interprets the notion o f economic and demographic stabilisation in several ways. It considers 
the numbers o f immigrants necessary to maintain the following values until the year 2050: 1} the largest number o f 
inhabitants achieved after 1995 assuming no migration; 2) the largest number o f the working-age population (15-64 
years) achieved before mid 21st c., assuming no migration; 3) a potential support ratio o f 3.0 (calculated as the number 
o f people aged 15-64 years divided by the number o f people aged 65+); 4) the highest potential support ratio that will 
be achieved to the year 2050 without migration. The produced estimates o f the number o f immigrants and o f the size o f 
the population that the country needs in the given scenario are compared w ith the baseline data derived from the 1998 
UN population outlook (the most probable variant and the same variant assuming no migration).
121. For the sake o f comparison let me add that the national reports on Italy and Germany produced in the mid-1990s 
indicated that immigration amounting to 12-15 million people was necessary to keep the same numbers o f their wor- 
king-age population by mid 21th c. (see [Bosworth, Burtless, 1998]).
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immigrants are assumed to be evenly distributed in time and that the new  population 
will contribute to higher numbers o f births in the receiving country.
A huge influx o f immigrants (100 millions in Europe, 47 millions in EU-15, and 18 
millions in Germany) would be necessary, even if efforts w ere made to keep the size 
of the European population at its maximal level recorded during the 55-year-period 
(being the desired state involving the lowest level o f immigration). Although the 
magnitude o f the necessary influx is embarrassing for many reasons, most countries 
are probably doom ed to receive immigrants. W ithout immigrants and with the UN 
outlook’s predictions o f fertility rates coming true, in 2050 the potential support 
ratio would reach worryingly low  values in many countries (1.52 in Italy and 1.75 in 
Germany).
According to the UN forecast o f 1998, by 2050 immigrants arriving after 1995 and 
their descendants w ill constitute for instance 6.2% in EU-15 and 19.8% in Germany. 
An influx o f immigrants fulfilling any o f the four objectives formulated by the UN 
forecasters would mean rapidly grow ing percentages o f ethnically foreign populations. 
Omitting at this point the most pro-m igration variant (w ith  the potential support ratio 
maintaining its maximal value), where none o f the analysed countries and regions 
has the percentages below  68%, even the variant that only aspires to keep the total 
numbers o f populations at a constant level produces surprising values for some o f the 
studied countries. In the variant, 28-29% o f people living in Italy and Germany, 18% in 
Europe and „only” 17% in EU-15 would be either immigrants or their descendants. The 
political incorrectness o f the question prevented the authors o f the report from asking 
about the countries o f origin from which the prospective immigrants could come. 
However, even a cursory look at the numbers explicitly shows that in the case o f the 
European countries the eastern parts o f the continent would not be the only or primary 
source o f immigrants, as every sixth person living in Europe in 2050 would have their 
roots -  directly or via their parents -  in other regions o f the w orld (the rate today is ca. 
5%). Is, therefore, a llow ing the possibility (o r  necessity, as some claim) o f immigrants 
substituting domestic fertility not a prelude to ethnic, cultural and religious conflicts 
that could erupt, as the recent years have sho122wn, in the countries affected by the 
problem? Given that the labour market shows both surplus and shortage o f workers 
and increasingly reveals the duality o f its character, perhaps other solutions protecting 
from social conflicts should be sought, especially considering the advancements in 
labour-saving technologies and techniques and the more and more commonly asked 
questions about the possibility o f provid ing the present citizens with jobs and wages 
that w ill enable them to live decent lives, and particularly w ith fair pensions paid by 
the capital-based systems?
The results o f demographic projections prepared by the statistical authorities in 
several European countries and discussed in a very interesting article by D. Coleman 
[2006] make the above questions even more relevant. The projections o f the ethnic 
composition tend to assume that the coming decades w ill have relatively constant
122. The immigration problem is, however, more complex than that, because a shortage o f workers is found for the 
low-skilled and low-paid jobs and for the high-skilled jobs involving the knowledge o f technical, exact, biochemical 
and medical sciences. It is so, because young Europeans are reluctant to study subjects requiring intellectual effort and 
discipline.
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levels o f immigration and that the immigrant population’s fertility exceeds that of 
the native population. Table 1 presents the projections’ outcomes that are the most 
relevant to the subject m atter o f this article.
Tab. 1 Shares o f populations o f foreign origin in selected European countries as 











2000 8.10 9.31 5.39 3.92
2050 7.80 28.00 7.94 5.07
England and 
Wales
2001 52.0 11.3 2.7 8.7
2051 63.1 36.1 11.6 24.5
Denmark
2004 5.4 8.74 2.40 5.96
2050 5.45 14.76 3.30 11.45
Germany
2000 82.20 9.90 3.28 6.57
2050 68.30 23.56 5.40 18.16
The Netherlands
2004 15.90 17.50 8.60 8.90
2050 16.90 29.70 13.20 16.50
Norway
2005 4.55 7.50 4.10 3.40
2060 5.58 23.50 9.20 14.30
Sweden
2004 9.01 15.90 9.66 6.25
2050 10.63 32.30 10.46 10.71
The italicised values in the last tw o columns concern the year 2030
HDI+ developed countries w ith the Human Development Index above its average 
value
HDI- underdeveloped countries w ith the Human Development Index below  its 
average value
Source: [Coleman, 2006: 414]
In W estern European countries trying to predict their ethnic compositions, people 
o f foreign origin account for 10-15% o f the population already today. In each o f the 
analysed cases, the structural ratios grow  to the year 2050, reaching from 1/4 to 1/3 
o f the total population123. At the same time, in the mid 21st c. Austria and Germany 
w ill have much smaller populations than at its outset, despite the fast grow ing sizes 
and shares o f the immigrant populations, while in the other countries populations 
w ill not expand w ithout immigrants, because the assumption about net international 
m igration not being positive leads to low er numbers o f populations in every instance.
123. Interestingly, if the present immigration trends and fertility differences continued in the long term, immigrants 
and the first generation o f their children would become majority populations in Sweden and the Netherlands before 
the 21st c. ended. D. Coleman believes [2007] that the situation may appear in a larger number o f western European 
countries.
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A particularly interesting aspect is the countries from which immigrants come. 
In the table above, only indirect information on the subject can be found. Although 
particular countries differently specify m inority groups in their estimations, the 
latter allow identifying comparable categories o f the developed countries (w here the 
Human Development Index exceeds the average -  HDI+) that can be equated w ith the 
European countries and those where most o f the population is o f European descent 
and o f the developing countries (HDI-). From the perspective o f this division, it is 
notable that the shares o f people having foreign origin w ill mainly increase (Austria 
being an exception] driven by the grow ing numbers and shares o f the non-European 
people whose outward appearance makes them different from most o f the country’s 
population, which w ill certainly be an additional roadblock to their assimilation.
3. Immigrant fertility
The changes outlined above w ill be induced by the combined influence o f 
immigration and higher fertility o f populations arriving from other continents. Let us 
illustrate the second factor using France, w here the ethnic studies point to different 
fertility o f the native French wom en and those belonging to ethnic minorities -  for 
instance, the total fertility rate as calculated for all female population in the country has 
been oscillating around 1.9 in the recent years, but for the foreign females it stands at 
around 2.6 [Coleman, 2006]. The more specific analyses show, however, that when the 
immigrant fem ales’ age at their arrival to France is taken into account, the difference 
between the immigrant and native fertility clearly decreases. For instance, in the last 
years o f the 20th century females born in metropolitan France had 1.7 children on 
average, while immigrant females 2.16. In this context, the substantial variations in 
females’ propensity to have children determ ined by their country o f origin are worth 
stressing -  while the Turkish wom en had 3.21 children on average and the Moroccans 
2.97, for the Spanish and Italian females the rates w ere only 1.52 and 1.6, respectively. 
The African females w ere found to be very special (Moroccans -  see above, Tunisians
-  2.9, Algerians -  2.57, other African countries -  2.86) and very different in fertility 
terms from the native population [Toulemon, 2004],
In France, likew ise in other countries pursuing „fam ily-friendly" social policies 
offering an extensive choice o f benefits, high fertility in the immigrant population 
is encouraged by family allowances that frequently constitute its major source o f 
livelihood, and quite often the primary one124. The rightist groups in France, alarmed 
by the high fertility o f the Muslim families, openly called some time ago for reducing
-  or even liquidating -  fam ily allowance granted to the fourth and next children and 
to children born by the second w ife125, proposing instead to use the funds saved to 
increase family allowances for families w ith few er children, which was intended to 
encourage the native French to take reproductive effort [Kiezun, 2007].
Generally, researchers studying this subj ect area point to the fact that the newcomers
124. In France, an additional inducement for female immigrants to have many children is the awareness that mothers 
that have raised at least five children are entitled to minimum pensions, even i f  they have no episodes o f gainful em­
ployment in their lives.
125. Getting a family allowance for the second wife's children is easy in France. Although the French state rejects po­
lygamy, it practically grants benefits to children born by successive w ife that shares the abode with her husband, thus 
theoretically forming a monoparental family.
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absorb the native family m odel w ith its number o f children very quickly as a result of 
which most differences between the fertility levels diminish w ithin the lifetim e o f one 
generation.
4. Changes in the religious composition o f the Western European population
The described changes in the ethnic structure o f the population w ill affect its 
religious composition as well. The statistics o f religions has never been very credible, 
because people (small religious groups and especially non-believers] are reluctant 
to reveal their religious beliefs, particularly if  d ifferent from  those predominating 
in their society. A fter the matters o f conscience w ere recognised as belonging to the 
personal sphere, the questions about individuals’ religion w ere gradually withdrawn 
from population censuses and from the records o f different demographic events in the 
20th century. Accordingly, this type o f information provides in Europe an outline rather 
than a precise picture o f the continental populations’ religions.
The aforementioned inflows o f people o f foreign origin to Europe w ill change the 
continent’s religious composition. For instance, in the mid-21st c. Austria is predicted to 
have -  depending on the assumptions -  from 14% to 26% o f Muslims in the total number 
o f its population, compared with only 4%  it has today (in 1980 Muslims constituted only 
1%, and the 1971 rate was only 0.3%) [Goujon et al., 2006], Between 1975 and 2005, 
the percentage o f persons declaring themselves Muslims increased in the UK from 1 to 
3%, the shares o f persons indicating religions other than Islam and Christianity growing 
in the same way [UKCH Religious Trends, 2005/2006], The religious composition can be 
generally expected to be more diverse, with the most common non-Christian religion 
being Islam, which already has millions o f practicing believers in the UK and France. 
The power o f Islam is strengthened by strong religious homogamy characterising its 
followers, whereby children smoothly accept their parents’ religion. High fertility126 and 
the structural factor (larger proportion o f young people being either in the peak fertility 
period or approaching it in the Muslim population than in the Christian population) -  
w ill exert a similar influence. Even then, R. Buttiglione was right to ask [2005: 20]: „can 
we blame Islam for taking over our land, if childless Europe voluntarily decides to give 
up her people and disappear from history?”
Many W estern European researchers studying the issue are fearful o f the outlined 
course o f events already today, because some estimates show that around the mid 
21st c. in France the adult Muslims w ill probably outnumber the adult non-Muslims, 
w ith all consequences o f the phenomena, such as the possibility o f the form er legally 
assuming pow er in the country in line w ith democratic procedures [Kiezun, 2007: 
20]. The estimates on Austria show that in 2051 Muslims may predominate in the age 
group to 15 years [Goujon et a l., 2006],
It has already been mentioned that the shares o f people fo llow ing other religions, 
quite exotic from  the European perspective, w ill also grow. This process w ill be 
accompanied by a decreasing proportion o f the Christian population, the reasons being 
not only the grow ing numbers o f the fo llowers o f other religions, but also secularization 
multiplying the ranks o f individuals declaring their atheistic outlook or treating 
religion as a very  personal matter. In the Czech Republic that besides the Netherlands
126. For instance, in 1981 the Austrian TFR for the Muslim females was 3.09, in 1991 it was 2.77 and 2.34 in 2001, 
whereas for all females living in the country the rates were 1.67,1.51 and 1.33, respectively [Goujon, 2006:13]
is commonly believed to have the most secular society in Europe, the share o f non­
believers increased from  7.1% in 1921 and 5.8% in 1950 to 59% in 2001127. A  UK 
study made in 2005 surprised its authors, as the share o f all believers they identified, 
irrespective o f their religions, was 76%, although a rate low er by 5-15 percentage 
points was expected128. It is worth emphasising, though, that among the members o f 
the youngest age groups whose religion was determ ined by their parents the share o f 
the non-believers was rising fast between younger and younger age groups, from 15- 
16% among teenagers to 23% for children aged 0-2 years, being an indication o f the 
likely direction and pace o f future changes.
5. Consequences o f the future ethnic changes
The coming decades w ill certainly witness grow ing ethnic and religious 
differentiation in Europe, fo llow ed by cultural, social and identity changes. It is very 
likely that the changes w ill spark escalating ethnic conflicts fuelled by different 
economic, social and political goals pursued by the native and foreign populations. 
The follow ing are examples o f potential problem  areas:
a. regional policy (native populations usually live in rural areas and small and
medium-sized towns, while immigrants are overrepresented in large cities);
b. social policy (because the natives predominate in the older population and the
immigrants in the younger age groups, particularly among teenagers and 
children, the first group w ill opt for more effective policy addressing old-age 
problems and the elderly, while the other group w ill push for school systems and 
family benefits -  an ethnic conflict may partially overlap an intergenerational 
conflict);
c. foreign policy (the „soft” approach to the problem o f Iraq or Iran that some European
governm ents present today arises from large groups o f Muslim voters).
At the local level, these problems can be particularly painful, as the immigrants tend 
to gravitate to larger towns. For instance, around the year 2000 40%  o f the Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam and London populations and 28%  o f the populations inhabiting Brussels 
and Frankfurt had foreign roots. Further inflows o f immigrants form ing densely 
populated areas may lead to residents o f foreign origin becom ing the majority in 
smaller administrative units129.
As far as the advantages o f the situation are concerned, the only ones seem to be 
larger population living on the continent and above all the continent’s more sizeable 
working-age population, because the hopes that some researchers express that a new  
nationality -  a European -  w ill develop from the grow ing ethnic diversity -  mainly 
due to mixed marriages and the resulting indefinite ethnic identity o f their offspring
127. Data source: http://www.czso.ez/eng/edicniplan.nsf/t/F80039F946/SFile/40320119.xls. Similar numbers can 
be found for East German Länder, where the self-declared non-believers accounted for 63.5% at the turn o f the 1980s 
compared with 7.6% in 1950 [Therborn, 1998]
128. It was so, because the proportion o f people declaring themselves Christian was higher than expected (70% ). Ear­
lier studies identified a much smaller share o f Christians -  the European Value Study o f 1999 found 66% and the British 
Social Attitude Report o f 1998 53% o f persons that considered themselves Christians. At the same time, the percentage 
o f baptised babies dropped between 1991 and 2001 from 51% to 45% [UKCH Religious Trends, 2005/2006].
129. This problem can be found in the UK, where people o f foreign origin exceed 50% in 9 areas o f the country (in large 
cities with quarter million populations). In the UK, all people who previously resided in the Commonwealth territory 
are automatically allowed to vote.
110
-  should be considered too high. There are many indications that the non-European 
immigrants and their descendants build their identity not around the secular notion 
of citizenship or there being part o f the entire society, but around their relatives, 
local communities (enclaves o f people sharing the same ethnic origin ) and religion 
[Coleman, 2006: 426].
From the standpoint o f social cohesion theory, the immigrants' acceptance o f their 
acculturation that in the contemporary world mainly works through the school system 
is vital for their children being easily able to adjust to the receiving country and for their 
chances o f success. The relevant studies point out that the various countries’ school 
systems have different effectiveness in form ing immigrants' children (e.g. Switzerland 
and Germany) and that the time o f parents’ arrival to the new  country as w ell as 
their country o f origin are o f importance. Generally, the offspring o f the Europeans 
and Far Easterners that have resettled in the recent years are better educated than 
the receiving societies. For other m igration areas the educational attainments are 
poorer, frequently because o f the immigrant parents’ reluctance or unawareness that 
they could choose better, free elem entary and secondary education for their children 
and due to problems arising from such decisions (e.g. the need to bring the child to a 
better school that is located in a different part o f the town). Notwithstanding the less 
favourable position that some immigrants have, the difference between the levels of 
education characterising the immigrant children and the native children is declining in 
the long term. The situation o f the immigrant children is im proving ow ing to the better 
perform ing econom ies and relatively low  levels o f unemployment in most European 
countries, and because o f their parents’ grow ing aspirations that materialise as 
increasingly sophisticated educational strategies. The strategies are formulated based 
on the finding that a market segment demanding higher qualifications from its potential 
workforce discriminates the descendants o f immigrants more rarely. However, the 
educational successes o f the European immigrants’ children are relatively new  and 
point to evolving motivation for changing one’s place o f residence. As recently as 20- 
30 years ago, the situation was different -  the social status o f most immigrants was 
relatively low, whereby their children’s w ere less educated than their native peers130.
The western European studies show, however, that the level o f unemployment 
among the immigrant populations and their children is usually tw ice as high as that 
recorded for the native population, while the level o f econom ic activity is slightly lower 
[Coleman, 2007].
6. Conclusion
The history o f humankind has never seen in times o f peace such immense changes 
as those that w ill shape the W estern European ethnic and religious structures in the 
coming decades. Because o f that, some researchers go as far as calling the changes 
„a third demographic transition" [Coleman, 2006]131.
130. W riting these words I am primarily drawing on the papers presented at the session on immigrants that was held 
during the conference European Society or European Societies. Euroconference on the Causes and Consequences o f 
Low Education in Contemporary Europe, Granada, 18-23 September 2004.
131. However, the term was used for the first time during the meetings o f the UN's demographic experts in the late 
1990s to describe the coexistence o f high levels o f economic activity among women o f fertile age and relatively high 
fertility levels in some European countries (Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands). The phenomenon was viewed 
as a symptom o f „a third transition" enabling w ork / life balance.
Piotr Szukalski 111
Already today the fear o f excessive shares o f immigrant populations makes some 
European countries pursue anti-immigration or selective immigration policies, 
depending how  they estimate the gravity o f the situation. The tendencies are likely to 
become even m ore distinct in the coming decades, one indication o f which is the slowly 
growing awareness that migration issues (concerning both internal and international 
migration) must be made part o f the EU’s agenda [Vignon, 2005].
It is very certain that by 2 050 Western Europe w ill redefine -  from the perspective o f 
particular regions -  its attitude to citizens’ rights and duties with respect to nationality 
and citizenship. The present debate concentrates on immigrants’ rights, while all 
voices pointing to the rights o f the native populations are treated as the manifestation 
of xenophobia or even racism. The future years w ill probably witness -  along with 
the shrinking shares o f the native populations (o r even their marginalisation in some 
regions) -  the native residents’ efforts to preserve their lifestyles, languages, religion 
and cultural heritage, which w ill inevitably lead to the redefinition o f the rights 
and duties that the m inority and majority groups have. In formulating EU's official 
documents, the opinions o f people uninvolved in the traditional political, normative 
and morality debates are taken into account more and more often. The reason is the 
necessity o f considering immigrants’ opinions that are sometimes very untraditional 
[G^sior-Niemiec, 2006].
So, what w ill the Western European society be like? Gyorgy’s opinions [2006] on 
the progressing -  also because o f the ethnic and religious factor -  social segmentation 
(a breakdown into groups pursuing com pletely different life program m es) seem 
to be very true. The Hungarian researcher believes that some reasons behind this 
process are the inability o f the traditional European culture to assimilate immigrants, 
its unattractiveness and a grow ing number o f Europeans believing that quite many 
immigrants -  especially those coming from the culturally different regions o f the world 
-  are „social parasites".
The article shows that in v iew  o f the expected influx o f immigrants the continent’s 
future w ill depend on the perception o f multiculturality and on the possibility o f 
building a single identity, „unity in diversity’’, despite all differences.
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